National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594
Aircraft Accident Brief Accident Number: DCA00MA030 Operator/Flight Number: Southwest Airlines flight 1455 Aircraft and Registration: Boeing 737-300, N668SW Location: Burbank, California Date: March 5, 2000 Adopted On: June 26, 2002
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On March 5, 2000, about 1811 Pacific standard time (PST),1 Southwest Airlines, Inc., flight 1455, a Boeing 737-300 (737), N668SW, overran the departure end of runway 8 after landing at Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport (BUR), Burbank, California. The airplane touched down at approximately 182 knots, and about 20 seconds later, at approximately 32 knots, collided with a metal blast fence and an airport perimeter wall. The airplane came to rest on a city street near a gas station off of the airport property. Of the 142 persons on board, 2 passengers sustained serious injuries; 41 passengers and the captain sustained minor injuries; and 94 passengers, 3 flight attendants, and the first officer sustained no injuries. The airplane sustained extensive exterior damage and some internal damage to the passenger cabin. During the accident sequence, the forward service door (1R) escape slide inflated inside the airplane; the nose gear collapsed; and the forward dual flight attendant jumpseat, which was occupied by two flight attendants, partially collapsed. The flight, which was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan, was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident, which occurred in twilight lighting conditions. According to Southwest Airlines records, the accident flight was the flight crew?s first flight of what was scheduled to be a 3-day flight sequence that consisted of five flights. The accident flight originated at McCarran International Airport (LAS), Las Vegas, Nevada, and was scheduled to depart about 1445 for BUR. The first officer of the accident flight stated to National Transportation Safety Board investigators that he arrived at LAS about 1245, and the captain indicated that he arrived about 1400. The first officer reported in a postaccident interview that he met the captain on the way to the gate. Southwest Airlines records indicate that the accident 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all times in this report are PST, based on a 24-hour clock, and are taken from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript. In some instances, the air traffic control (ATC) transcript indicates times that are different from those in the CVR transcript. 2 NTSB/AAB-02/04 airplane arrived at LAS from Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California, about 1630, almost 2 hours behind schedule, because of rain and gusting winds in the LAS area. The accident flight crew indicated that the preflight inspection was normal and that no maintenance discrepancies were noted. Flight 1455 departed the gate about 1650, more than 2 hours behind schedule. During postaccident interviews, the flight crew indicated to Safety Board investigators that the takeoff and en route portions of the flight to BUR were normal and uneventful. The first officer stated that after the flight crossed the PMD very high frequency omni-directional radio range (VOR)2 navigation transmitter at 8,000 feet, he obtained information Oscar from the BUR airport terminal information service (ATIS), which indicated that winds were from 260° at 18 knots, gusting to 26 knots, and that aircraft were landing on runways 33 and 26. At 1754:21, the captain stated, ?plan on [runway] three three at the moment. [A]pproach descent checklist when you get the chance.? At 1802:52, the flight crew was advised by the Southern California terminal radar approach control (SCT) Woodland controller that the current ATIS was information Papa and that they should expect an instrument landing system (ILS) landing on runway 8. At 1803:29, when the airplane was about 20 nautical miles (nm) north of the BUDDE outer marker3 at an altitude of about 8,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the Woodland controller instructed flight 1455 to turn left to a heading of 190° and to descend to and maintain 6,000 feet msl. The first officer acknowledged the instructions. At 1804:02, when the airplane was about 19 nm north of the BUDDE outer marker at an altitude of about 7,800 feet msl, the SCT Woodland controller stated, ?Southwest fourteen fifty five, maintain two thirty or greater ?til advised please.? The captain acknowledged the airspeed adjustment assignment.4 The Woodland controller indicated in a postaccident interview that he imposed the speed restriction as part of sequencing Southwest flight 1455 between Southwest flight 1713 and Executive Jet flight 278. After the first officer obtained information Papa, he switched back to the approach control frequency. At 1804:42, he informed the captain that the target airspeed for the approach would be 138 knots and, at 1804:49, that winds were ?down to six knots.? A few seconds later, he confirmed that aircraft were landing at BUR on runway 8. At 1805:08, when the airplane was about 16 nm north of the BUDDE outer marker at an altitude of about 6,000 feet msl, the SCT Woodland controller instructed flight 1455 to ?turn left heading one six zero.? At 1805:13, the captain indicated to the first officer that ATC ?wants two hundred thirty knots or greater, for a while.? 2 The PMD VOR, which is located in Palmdale, California, is 30 miles northeast of BUR. 3 The BUDDE outer marker is located 6 miles west of BUR?s runway 8 threshold. 4 The first officer indicated in postaccident interviews that while he was obtaining the new ATIS information, the captain communicated with ATC. 3 NTSB/AAB-02/04 At 1805:54, the SCT Woodland controller cleared flight 1455 to descend to and maintain 5,000 feet and advised the pilots that they were following company traffic (Southwest Airlines flight 1713) that was at their ?one o?clock and twelve miles [ahead of them] turning onto the final out of forty six hundred.? The first officer acknowledged the clearance. At 1807:43, the Woodland controller cleared flight 1455 to descend to and maintain 3,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged the clearance. At 1808:18, the first officer notified ATC that he had the Southwest traffic in sight. At 1808:19, the Woodland controller issued an altitude restriction by stating, ?cross Van Nuys at or above three thousand,[5] cleared visual approach runway eight.?6 The first officer acknowledged the clearance. At 1808:36, as the airplane was descending through about 3,800 feet msl, the captain began turning to the left for the final approach. In postaccident interviews, the flight crew told investigators that, during the approach, the captain?s navigation radio was tuned to the ILS frequency for runway 8, and the first officer?s radio was tuned to the Van Nuys VOR. They indicated that the autopilot was engaged in the VOR/LOC mode7 and that the airplane captured the localizer course but then overshot the centerline before correcting back.8 The captain stated to investigators that as the flight passed about 2 miles west of Van Nuys at 3,000 feet at approximately 220 to 230 knots, he deployed the speed brakes. According to the CVR, at 1809:28, when the airplane was at an indicated airspeed of about 220 knots, the captain called for ?flaps five.? At 1809:32, the flaps began to extend. At 1809:43, the captain called for ?gear down.? The captain indicated in a postaccident interview that at this point in the flight, he noted a 20-knot tailwind indication on the flight management system (FMS) screen.9 At 1809:53, the BUR tower controller stated, ?Southwest fourteen fifty five, wind uh?two one zero at six [knots], runway eight, cleared to land.? Simultaneously, the captain called for ?flaps fifteen.?10 At 1810:01, the captain again called for ?flaps?fifteen? and ?[flaps] twenty five.? From 1810:24 until 1810:59, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) alerts were being continuously broadcast in the cockpit, first as ?sink rate? and then, at 1810:44, switching to ?whoop, whoop, pull up.? At 1810:29, the captain stated, ?flaps thirty, just put it down.? At 1810:33, the captain stated, ?put it to [flaps] forty. [I]t won?t go, I know that. [I]t?s all right. 5 According to the Pilot/Controller Glossary, restrictions are defined as ?[a]n altitude or altitudes, stated in the order flown, which are to be maintained until reaching a specific point or time. Altitude restrictions may be issued by ATC due to traffic, terrain, or other airspace considerations.? 6 Flight 1455?s 230-knot airspeed adjustment assignment was no longer applicable after the SCT Woodland controller issued the visual approach clearance. (For more information about speed adjustment assignments, see the section titled, ?Company Procedures.?) In a postaccident interview with Safety Board investigators, the controller stated that he did not know why he did not cancel the restriction sooner. 7 The VOR/LOC mode is used to command the autopilot to intercept the selected localizer radio course. 8 FAA radar data show that the airplane crossed the BUDDE outer marker at about 3,200 feet msl at an indicated airspeed of about 225 knots. 9 No evidence exists on the CVR transcript of a discussion between the pilots about the tailwind. 10 At 1809:54, the flaps extended to 5°; at 1810:01, the flaps extended to 10°; at 1810:08, the flaps extended to 25°; at 1810:29, the flaps extended to 30°; and at 1811:05, the flaps extended to between 30° and 40°. 4 NTSB/AAB-02/04 [F]inal descent checklist.? After the GPWS ?whoop, whoop, pull up? alert sounded at 1810:47, the captain stated, ?that?s all right,? at 1810:53. A final ?sink rate? warning was recorded at 1810:55. The first officer stated in a postaccident interview that instead of reading the final descent checklist,11 he visually confirmed the checklist items and remembered seeing the captain arm the ground spoilers. The first officer also stated that when the captain called for flaps 40°, the airspeed was about 180 knots and went as high as 190 knots during the approach.12 The first officer indicated that he pointed to his airspeed indicator to alert the captain of the flap limit speed of 158 knots at flaps 40°. The captain told Safety Board investigators that he remembered hearing the ?sink rate? warning from the GPWS but that he did not react to the warning because he did not feel that he had to take action. He stated that he did not remember any other GPWS warnings during the approach. The first officer indicated in a postaccident interview that he heard both the ?sink rate? and the ?pull up? GPWS warnings but that he believed that the captain was correcting. The first officer also indicated to investigators that he selected the ?Progress? page13 on the FMS cockpit display unit but that he could not recall what the wind values were during the approach. He stated to investigators that he was concerned that the ground speed was faster than normal but added that he did not verbalize his concern to the captain. The first officer further indicated to investigators that he felt that the approach was stabilized and that they were in a position to land. The captain stated in a postaccident interview that he was aware that Southwest Airlines? standard procedure14 was for the captain and first officer to call ?1,000 [feet above ground level (agl)], airspeed, and sink rate? when descending through 1,000 feet. However, no such callouts were recorded by the CVR. The captain also stated in a postaccident interview that he visually perceived that the airplane was ?fast? as it crossed the approach end of runway 8. CVR and FDR data indicate that the airplane touched down at 1810:58 with flaps extended to 30° at about 182 knots; flaps then extended to 40° during the ground roll at about 145 knots. The captain stated to Safety Board investigators that after touchdown, the end of the runway appeared to be closer than it should have been and that he thought they might hit the blast fence wall. The captain indicated that he braked ?pretty good? while attempting to stop the airplane. FDR data indicate that the captain unlocked the thrust reversers 3.86 seconds after touchdown and that the thrust reversers deployed 4.91 seconds after touchdown. The first officer stated to investigators that the captain applied the wheel brakes before the airplane had 11 The final descent checklist includes notifying the flight attendants, checking the flight and navigational instruments, placing the landing gear down, arming the speed brake, positioning the wing flaps, and disengaging the autopilot. 12 Flight data recorder (FDR) and radar data indicate that at 1810:33, the airspeed was about 190 knots. 13 The ?Progress? page indicates dynamic flight and navigation data, including track, path, temperature, speed, and headwind or tailwind information. 14 For more information about Southwest Airlines? procedures, see the section titled, ?Company Information.? 5 NTSB/AAB-02/04 decelerated to 80 knots15 and that, as the airplane passed the Southwest Airlines passenger boarding gates,16 he joined the captain in braking the airplane and applied the brakes as hard as he could. The captain indicated that as the airplane neared the end of the runway, he initiated a right turn using only the nosewheel steering tiller (not the rudder pedals). At 1811:20, the cockpit area microphone (CAM) recorded impact sounds. The airplane departed the right side of the runway about 30° from the runway heading, penetrated a metal blast fence and an airport perimeter wall, and came to a stop on a city street off of the airport property. An emergency evacuation ensued, and all crewmembers and passengers successfully exited the airplane.17 PERSONNEL INFORMATION Both flight crewmembers were certificated pursuant to Southwest Airlines and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification requirements. A review of FAA records indicated that the flight crewmembers had no history of airplane accidents or enforcement actions. In addition, both flight crewmembers held valid driver?s licenses for the states in which they lived. Records at the National Driver Register found no indication of driver?s license revocation or suspension for either pilot. Further, both flight crewmembers provided urine specimens and breath samples for postaccident drug and alcohol testing, the results of which were negative. The Captain At the time of the accident, the captain, age 52, held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate, issued October 25, 1979, with the ratings and limitations of airplane multiengine land; commercial privileges for airplane single engine land; and type ratings for 737, Gulfstream G-159, and Convair CV-240, -340, and -440 airplanes. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on October 19, 1999, with the limitation that he must possess corrective glasses while flying.18 According to the captain, he served as a pilot in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) from 1970 to 1975 at Mather Air Force Base, Sacramento, California. In 1976, he acquired his 737 type rating through United Airlines and, from 1977 to 1979, flew as a 737 first officer for Wien Air Alaska. From 1979 to 1980, he flew Gulfstream G-159s and King Airs as a captain for Coleman Air Transport. From 1980 to 1988, he was employed by the EG&G Corporation and flew 737s as captain and first officer. 15 For more information about Southwest Airlines? braking procedures, see the section titled, ?Company Information.? Pilots are advised to initiate braking after 80 knots under normal landing conditions or before 80 knots if conditions require earlier use. 16 The Southwest Airlines passenger boarding gates are parallel to runway 8 and are located about 1,000 feet before the end of the runway. 17 For more information about the emergency evacuation, see the section titled, ?Survival Aspects.? 18 The captain indicated to Safety Board investigators that he normally wore glasses while flying at night. 6 NTSB/AAB-02/04 The captain began his employment at Southwest Airlines on July 7, 1988. According to the captain, at the time of the accident, he had accumulated a total of approximately 11,000 hours of flight time. He had flown 737s for Southwest Airlines for a total of 9,870 hours, 5,302 of which were as pilot-in-command. The captain had flown for Southwest Airlines 123.3, 88.8, 52.1, and 15 hours in the 90, 60, 30, and 7 days, and 1.4 hours in the 24 hours, before the accident, respectively. The captain?s most recent systems training took place on October 10, 1999, and his most recent proficiency check and training took place on October 11, 1999. His most recent 737 line check was on October 29, 1999. During postaccident interviews, a first officer at Southwest Airlines with whom the accident captain had flown described the accident captain as easy to get along with and rated him as an average captain. He indicated that he never felt uncomfortable flying with the captain and that the captain operated according to company procedures. Another Southwest Airlines captain described the accident captain as congenial, mild-mannered, and someone who got along well with everyone. At the time of the accident, the captain lived in the Las Vegas, Nevada, area. He indicated that, during the 3 days before the accident, he exercised moderately by jogging and playing golf. He stated that he normally went to bed about 2300 and awoke between about 0730 and 0830. The captain stated that on March 4th, he went to bed about midnight and felt well rested when he awoke on March 5th about 0830. He indicated that he called crew scheduling about 0900, jogged 4 miles, lifted weights, and ate breakfast. He reported that he left his home about 1330 and arrived at LAS about 1400. The First Officer At the time of the accident, the first officer, age 43, held an ATP certificate, issued December 18, 1995, with the ratings and limitations of airplane multiengine land, commercial privileges for airplane single engine land, and type rating for the 737. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on October 18, 1999, with no limitations. The first officer reported to investigators that he had completed 12 years of active duty in the USAF during which he flew F-15 fighter airplanes. He stated that, after completing his active service, he flew F-16s in the USAF reserve. His total military flight time at the time of the accident was approximately 2,500 hours. The first officer was hired by Southwest Airlines on November 14, 1996. According to the first officer, at the time of the accident, he had accumulated a total of approximately 5,022 hours of flight time. He had flown 737s for Southwest Airlines for a total of 2,522 hours. The first officer had flown for Southwest Airlines 212.1, 123.8, 60.7, and 22.5 hours in the 90, 60, 30, and 7 days, and 1.4 hours in the 24 hours, before the accident, respectively. The first officer received his initial 737 type rating on December 18, 1995, and completed his 737 initial operating experience on December 26, 1996. His most recent systems training took place on October 25, 1999, and his most recent proficiency check and training took place on October 31, 1998. His most recent 737 line check was on October 29, 1999. 7 NTSB/AAB-02/04 During postaccident interviews, a captain who had flown with the first officer stated that the first officer was very well qualified and was an above-average copilot with good aviation skills who was likable and pleasant. Another captain who had flown with the first officer indicated that, on their flights together, the first officer did a great job and displayed good judgment throughout the trip. At the time of the accident, the first officer lived in the Salt Lake City, Utah, area. He indicated that, during the 3 days before the accident, he performed light household chores and worked at the USAF reserve unit, performing paperwork duties on March 2nd and flying an F-16 fighter airplane for one flight on March 3rd. He stated that he normally went to bed about or before 2300 and awoke between about 0700 and 0730. The first officer stated that he awoke on March 5th about 0800. He indicated that he called crew scheduling and notified them that he would report directly to LAS for the flight to BUR. He stated that he left his home about 1000; boarded the Southwest Airlines flight from Salt Lake City, Utah, to LAS about 1120; and arrived at LAS about 1245. The Air Traffic Controller The SCT Woodland controller on duty at the time of the accident, who was also a private pilot with about 145 hours of flight time, was hired by the FAA in May 1989. He received his initial ATC training in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and began work at Gillespie Field Airport, San Diego, California, as a full performance level controller. In April 1992, he went to Lindbergh Airport, San Diego, California, and, in September 1998, he was transferred to SCT. The day of the accident was the second day of a 5-day work week for the Woodland controller, who was assigned the 1300-to-2100 shift. AIRPLANE INFORMATION N668SW, a 737-300, serial number (S/N) 23060, was registered to Southwest Airlines on January 25, 1996, and was equipped with two CFM International CFM56-3 engines. The maximum landing weight of the airplane is 114,000 pounds (lbs).19 The 737 is configured with a flap load limiter system that prevents the flap panels from extending to the 40° position until the airspeed is below 158 knots, even if the flap handle is placed in the 40° position above that speed. The 737 has 10 spoiler panels (5 on each wing), 4 of which are flight spoilers that are used for maintaining lateral control, reducing airspeed in flight, and aiding braking after touchdown, and 6 of which are ground spoilers that are used to aid braking after touchdown. 19 The landing weight of the accident airplane was estimated to be 113,425 lbs. 8 NTSB/AAB-02/04 According to Southwest Airlines, its 737 autobrake systems are deactivated so that all Southwest cockpit configurations will be as similar as possible. Therefore, Southwest pilots must use manual braking during landing. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The transcription of ATIS information Papa follows: burbank airport information papa zero one five three zulu wind two four zero at six visibility one zero few clouds at six thousand five hundred ceiling niner thousand overcast temperature niner dew point one altimeter two niner six five i l s runway eight approach in use arriving and departing runway eight and runway one five. Weather observations at BUR were made by an automated surface observation system and augmented by ATC under the limited aviation weather reporting station. Weather conditions reported about 1653, about 1 hour and 17 minutes before the accident, were the following: wind from 270 degrees at 18 knots gusting to 26 knots, visibility 10 miles, a few clouds at 3,900 feet, ceiling overcast at 5,500 feet, temperature 11.1 degrees C [Celsius] (52 degrees F [Fahrenheit]), dew point 2.2 degrees C (36 degrees F), altimeter 29.60 inches of hg [mercury]. Weather conditions reported about 1820, about 10 minutes after the accident, were the following: wind from 250 degrees true at 6 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 9,500 feet, temperature 9 degrees?[C] (48 degrees F), dew point temperature 0 degrees C (32 degrees F), altimeter 29.66 inches of?hg. The BUR airport reported that 0.77 inch of rain had fallen in the 8 hours before the accident and that a wind shift associated with a cold frontal passage had occurred. Runway 8 was wet at the time of the accident. AIRPORT INFORMATION BUR is located about 3 miles northwest of Burbank, California, at an elevation of 775 feet. The airport is in the east-southeastern end of the San Fernando Valley, between the San Gabriel Mountains and the Pacific coastline. BUR is owned by the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority and is operated under contract by a private company, Airport Group International. BUR has an FAA-approved airport emergency plan and is certified by the FAA as 9 NTSB/AAB-02/04 an aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) index C20 facility under 14 CFR Part 139. The last FAA annual airport certification inspection took place from December 8 through 10, 1999. BUR has two grooved asphalt runways, 8/26 and 15/33. During postaccident interviews, BUR ATC tower personnel indicated to investigators that runway 8, which is used ?most of the time? for landings, is the only arrival runway that avoids high terrain and that runway 26 is used infrequently by air carriers for landing because of terrain to the south and east of the airport. They stated to investigators that runway 33 is used for landings when the tailwind component for runway 8 exceeds 10 knots and wind is from the northwest. They also indicated that no instrument approach is available for runway 33, and rising terrain is located under the left base segment of the traffic pattern to this runway. BUR ATC tower personnel stated that, for runway 15, aircraft must be established on final approach for landing before descending out of 3,000 feet. They indicated that the San Gabriel Mountains are located north of runway 15 and that hang glider activity sometimes exists in the area of the final approach to runway 15. Runway 8 Runway 8, which is 6,032 feet long and 150 feet wide, is configured for precision instrument landings and equipped with high-intensity runway edge lights, distance-to-go markers, and a medium-intensity approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights. A precision approach path indicator (PAPI) is located 1,520 feet from the approach end of runway 8 on the left side of the runway. Runway Safety Areas Title 14 CFR 139.309 defines the requirements for the provision and maintenance of runway safety areas (RSA). The design and construction standards of RSAs are further defined in Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5300-13, ?Airport Design,? dated September 29, 1989. The AC indicates that the longitudinal dimensions of an RSA should extend for the full length of the runway and 1,000 feet beyond the physical threshold of each runway end. The AC further indicates that the lateral dimensions of an RSA should extend 250 feet both left and right of the runway centerline and for the full length of the longitudinal RSA. The lateral dimensions of the runway 8 RSA measure 250 feet on each side of the runway centerline, except for the southern edge of runway 8 east of the runway 15/33 intersection, which measures 125 feet and is marked with a movement/nonmovement area delineator line. The passenger terminal is located south of runway 8 in this area. The longitudinal dimensions of the RSA at the arrival end of runway 8 measure 200 feet, and no significant longitudinal RSA exists on the departure end of runway 8. A metal blast fence is located 32 feet from the departure end of runway 8. 20 According to 14 CFR 139.315 and 139.317, an ARFF index C facility should have two or three firefighting vehicles with a total of at least 3,000 gallons of water and aqueous film-forming foam. 10 NTSB/AAB-02/04 On March 16, 2000, the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority Executive Director sent a letter to the Safety Board?s Airport/Emergency Response Group Chairman to clarify the status of RSAs at BUR. In his letter, he stated the following: The Authority determined that the greatest safety concern and risk to life and property was the close proximity of the passenger terminal and the close proximity of parked and taxiing aircraft adjacent to both runways. The Authority made the decision to pursue replacement of the passenger terminal as its highest priority?.Concurrently with the process of replacing the terminal, the Authority has pursued the acquisition of clear zone properties and has considered the possibility of lowering Hollywood Way for the purpose of creating a[n] overrun area. The Authority did successfully acquire some existing parking lots in the RPZ (runway protection zone). On August 14, 2000, the airport authority submitted an application to the city of Burbank to construct a replacement passenger terminal that would be located 1/2 mile north of the current terminal. However, in an April 10, 2002, letter, the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority Executive Director informed the Safety Board that ?58% of the voters of Burbank approved an initiative that deprives the Burbank City Council of its power to approve any terminal project agreement with the Airport Authority unless and until a lengthy series of conditions[22] is met.? As a result, on December 4, 2001, the City of Burbank ?imposed a moratorium on the issuance of building permits for any and all activities at the airport that would require permits?[which] has effectively halted all development activity at the airport.? Engineered Materials Arresting System On August 17, 2001, the FAA?s Airport Improvement Program awarded $1.9 million to BUR to install an engineered materials arresting system (EMAS) at the departure end of runway 8.23 The investigation revealed that installation of an EMAS was completed in January 2002 and that the system was fully operational. The system is about 170 feet long and 170 feet wide. No other EMASs are projected to be installed at BUR. FLIGHT RECORDERS Cockpit Voice Recorder The airplane was equipped with a Fairchild A-100A CVR, S/N 52619. The CVR?s exterior showed no evidence of structural damage, and the interior sustained no heat or impact damage. The recording consisted of good quality audio information, including the captain?s and first officer?s CAMs. The recording started at 1743:16, before the approach to BUR, and 21 The Part 161 study began in December 2001. 22 These conditions primarily involve the resolution of noise and environmental issues. 23 EMAS is a system that slows an aircraft when its wheels roll through frangible cellular cement. 11 NTSB/AAB-02/04 continued uninterrupted until 1814:49, shortly after the airplane departed the end of runway 8 and came
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